

stopped with every available weapon
and without
further notice in the following
blockade zones
around Great Britain, France, Italy and
the Eastern
Mediterranean. . . ."

The zones, as defined in the
memorandum, covered
all the seas and oceans surrounding the
British Isles,
France, Belgium, Italy, except a small part
of the
Mediterranean bordering Spain.

With the effect of this announcement
upon America
I will deal in another chapter.

During its opening weeks, the new
submarine
campaign seemed as though it would
justify all the
hopes of those who had gambled upon it.

Early successes In the first week of
February, 1917,

Campaign 35 vessels, British and
foreign, were
sunk in the English Channel and its
western approaches. In the course of
February and
March the number of British merchant
vessels lost
through enemy action (mainly submarine
attacks)
was 232, with a gross tonnage of 663,000
tons. In
April, our shipping losses for that one
month alone
were more than 526,000 tons. In
addition, upwards
of 200,000 tons of Allied and Neutral
shipping was
being sunk every month.

The effect on the Admiralty was to stun
and not
to stimulate. But even now
they would not
listen to the idea of convoying
ships.

Hopelessness These were like doctors who,
whilst they

at the Admiralty are 11 ^ .1 >
unable to arrest the
ravages of a

disease which is gradually weakening the
resistance of a patient despite all their
efforts, are
suddenly confronted with a new,
unexpected and
grave complication. They go about with
gloomy
mien and despondent hearts. Their
reports are full